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The regulation of scientific work
Government research councils, national science
foundations and the like have become ubiquitous. The
first one seems to have been the US National Science
Foundation (NSF), created in 1950; the similarly named
organization with an equivalent function in Switzerland
was established in 1952; the UK Science Research
Council was formed in 1965; and so forth. The mode of
operation of these organizations was to issue “calls for
proposals” (i.e., general invitations to scientists to submit
project proposals) and then disburse funds according to
an assessment of proposals received. The main effect
seems to have been a general stifling of innovative ideas,
since the final decisions whether to fund a given project
are made by a committee, which, almost axiomatically,
favours the most conservative ideas.
Countries like France and the Soviet Union were
organized differently. Financial provision for science was
in the hands of centralized bodies such as the Academy
of Sciences and most science was carried out the within
institutes affiliated to the Academy. An individual scientist
wishing to work on a new idea merely had to convince
the director of his or her institute of its value. Since the
institute constituted a living community, its internal spirit
both fostered the emergence of new ideas and facilitated
their investigation.
For reasons which are not clear, the Academy-based
system has been gradually abandoned. Russia formed its
own equivalent to a national science foundation (the
Russian Foundation for Basic Research) in 1992, and
other countries formerly affiliated to the Soviet Union
have done likewise; for example, the Georgian Science
Foundation was created in 2005, and France now has its
Agence Nationale de la Recherche, founded in 2007. The
European Union has adopted a similar approach for its
research and technical development programmes.
Apart from the inverse relationship between the
novelty of an idea and the possibility of convincing a
committee to fund its development, the research council/
science foundation approach is impersonal and
bureaucratic. The last attribute might seem surprising to
an outsider, because was not the Academy a central
body? Yes, and it was powerful enough to ensure that it
had an appropriate allocation of funds from the state
treasury; this power was then efficiently dispersed
among the constituent institutes, which were free to
spend the money as they saw fit; it was the responsibility
of the institute director to ensure a balanced budget.
Beyond providing a page summarizing his or her work for
the annual report issued to the general public, the
scientist’s need to provide a written record of activity
was fulfilled by publishing papers in scientific journals.
On the other hand, if the scientist applies to a research
council/science foundation, a lengthy document is
required—and if the proposal is not funded, which
typically applies to about 80% of applications, then the
work in preparing the document is largely wasted; much
of the text has to deal with administrative matters such as
how the management of the project will be organized.
Funded proposals oblige the scientist to provide regular
reports to the funding body, detailing every item, large or
small, of expenditure. Small wonder that the scientist
may then have little energy left for writing a scientific
paper; those reporting research council-funded projects
are typically rather pedestrian, with an emphasis on what
was done in the most concrete sense (a description of
which forms the main content of the obligatory reports)
rather than developing an idea and its wider implications
and consequences.
The purpose of this Editorial is not to criticize the
research council/science foundation system, which has
been and continues to be done elsewhere, but to point out
that these funding bodies essentially function as
regulators of science, in the same way that many
industries (for example public utilities in the UK) have
regulators. Is this desirable? Regulation was introduced
in the UK when the public utilities ceased being state
monopolies. Since competition, which is supposed to be
the guarantor of quality provided to the consumer in a
free enterprise economy, is scarcely possible in the case
of a monopoly,1 the regulator is supposed to provide the
guarantee. Isambard Kingdom Brunel, opposing the
appointment of Government Inspectors of Railways in
1841, has given an eloquent critique: “Railway engineers
understand very well how to look after the public safety,
and putting a person over them must shackle them. They
have not only more ability to find out what was necessary
than any inspecting officer could have, but they had a
greater desire to do it.”2 In fact, the diminution of risk is
considered to be another important function of regulation.
It is surprising why this notion persists despite much
evidence showing that the diminution of flexibility
operational flexibility implied by regulation actually
increases danger. A poignant example is the total loss of
1 Competition exists inasmuch as an inefficient company could be taken over by an efficient one. Inefficiency, however, concerns
the returns to investors rather than the quality of service provided to customers.
2 L.T.C. Rolt, Isambard Kingdom Brunel, pp. 217–218. London: Longmans, Green & Co. (1957).
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flight SR 111 in September 1998, which is now known to
have been caused by a major electrical fault. The first
symptom was smoke entering the cockpit. The captain
followed the rule stating that if smoke appears in the
cockpit, the cause must be discovered (instead of, for
example, using his personal judgment and landing as soon
as possible)—until the bitter end when total loss of
control occurred.
A cynic might argue that at least the large staff
requirements of research councils/science foundations
provide employment for ex-research scientists (many of
the staff have PhDs), rather like former military officers
becoming college bursars. Any such positive feature is,
however, outweighed by the negative ones, such as the
bias towards conservatism when the final decision
whether to fund is made, as already mentioned; the
temptation to partiality during the reviewing of proposals
(carried out by individual scientists) prior to the final
committee meeting; and the transformation of independent
research scientists to mere laboratory functionaries (due
to the need to follow the contractually agreed research
programme of a funded project to the letter3). Even two
millennia ago, we find in the Daodejing (Ch. 58) the
admonition that “the more prohibitions there are, the
poorer the people”. If, since then, evidence to the
contrary had been accumulated then the current trend
would be comprehensible. Since that does not appear to
be the case, discovering the cause of the current trend
would form the basis of a suitable proposal (but not one
likely to be funded by a research council).
 J.J. RAMSDEN
3 Lest it be felt that there is at least a trend away from this, the recently (2007) launched European Research Council obliges
recipients of funding to keep detailed time sheets and accounts of all expenditure, and restricts their freedom to change
direction as the research evolves.
